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We provide a selective overview of the academic research literature on value and growth investing. Differ-
ent explanations for the performance of value versus growth stocks are discussed. Empirical research on
the alternative explanations is reviewed, and some new results are provided with an updated sample. The
evidence suggests that, even after taking into account the experience of the late 1990s, value investing gen-
erates superior returns. Common measures of risk do not support the argument that the return differential
is due to the higher riskiness of value stocks. Instead, behavioral considerations and the agency costs of
delegated investment management lie at the root of the value-growth spread.The topic of value and growth investing offers a shining example of the fruitful exchange of ideas be-
tween academic research and investment practice. The results from academic studies have formed the basis
for investment strategies that are widely applied in equity markets. Going the other way, issues encountered
by portfolio managers and consultants such as procedures for identifying value or growth styles, and the
design of style-speciﬁc benchmark indexes for performance evaluation, have spurred ongoing analysis and
extensions in the research literature.
The explosion of academic interest in value and growth investment strategies can be traced back to Fama
and French (1992), and Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994). The results of Fama and French delivered
a stunning blow to the explanatory power of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, and sparked debates about the
“death of beta.” In the wake of this study, academics shifted their attention to the ratio of book-to-market
value of equity, and ﬁrm size as the leading explanatory variables for the cross-section of average stock
returns. In turn, this work built on earlier studies of stock market “anomalies.” Basu (1977), for example,
showed that stocks with low price-to-earnings ratios subsequently tend to have higher average returns than
stocks with high ratios. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) study Japanese data and ﬁnd strong support
for the superior performance of value investment strategies.
Based on the accumulated weight of the evidence from studies on the book-to-market effect and re-
lated anomalies, the academic community has generally come to agree that value strategies on average out-
perform growth investment strategies. There is much less consensus, however, on the underlying reasons for
the superior returns. On the one hand, Fama and French take the position of the efﬁcient markets hypothesis,
and attribute the higher returns of value strategies to their increased risk. On the other hand, Lakonishok,
Shleifer and Vishny suggest that cognitive biases underlying investor behavior, and the agency costs of pro-
fessional investment management are at the root of the rewards to value investing. Yet another explanation
for the returns to value investing rests on methodological issues of data selection bias (see Kothari, Shanken
and Sloan (1995)). A careful study by Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995), however, suggests that any
such bias cannot explain the differential performance of value and growth investing.1
1See also Davis (1994), who conﬁrms the book-to-market effect in a sample that is less susceptible to any biases affecting early
observations in the Compustat ﬁles that are used in many studies.
1The academic work on value investing has had a strong impact on professional investment management.
Value and growth are now widely recognized distinctive specializations adopted by money managers. Addi-
tionally, the research studies have been instrumental in the development of style-speciﬁc benchmarks which
have proliferated in performance evaluation and attribution analysis. Many such benchmarks are based on
a variable that has been extensively used in academic studies, namely the ratio of book to market value of
equity, and this has become an important indicator of a portfolio’s orientation toward either growth or value.
This paper provides a review of the academic research on value and growth investing. We begin by
surveying the evidence on the performance of value investment strategies. The underlying reasons for the
performance are more controversial, so we also give an overview of the evidence on various explanations
for the returns on value strategies. Finally we provide some updated evidence.
1 The returns on value investing
Table 1 summarizes the results from three key, early studies of the returns from value-growth investment
strategies. Panel A of the Table draws from Fama and French (1992), which sorts stocks on the New York,
American and Nasdaq markets into ten portfolios based on stocks’ book-to-market (panel A1) or earnings-
to-price (panel A2) ratios. The top and bottom decile portfolios are each further divided into equal halves.
In the sort by book-to-market, the highest-ranked (value) portfolio generates an average return of 1.83
percent. Compared to the average return on the lowest-ranked (glamour) portfolio of 0.30 percent, value
stocks come out ahead by 1.53 percent per month. At the same time, the market betas of the portfolios
are very close to each other so systematic risk is not an obvious suspect for explaining the differences in
returns. Value stocks with high book-to-market on average tend to be smaller than growth stocks, however:
the logarithm of size for the top (bottom) portfolio is 2.65 (4.53). It is thus possible that part of the book-to-
market effect reﬂects the historical premium of small ﬁrms over large ﬁrms (see Banz (1981)).
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) provide similar ﬁndings based on NYSE and American Ex-
change stocks. Since they report buy-and-hold returns over several years following portfolio formation,
their results are particularly relevant from the perspective of a long-term investor. In panel B1, value stocks
2(portfolio 10) out-perform growth stocks (portfolio 1) by 10.5 percent per year on average over the ﬁve years
following portfolio formation. The superior returns persist even after controlling for the above-noted dif-
ferences in size. The average size-adjusted return over the ﬁve post-formation years for the value portfolio
is 3.5 percent compared to -4.3 percent for the growth portfolio, resulting in a spread of 7.8 percent. The
book-to-market effect, in other words, is not subsumed by the size effect.
While the book-to-market ratio has garnered the lion’s share of attention as an indicator of value-growth
orientation, it is by no means an ideal measure. To take an example from market conditions as of mid-2002,
a stock such as AOL-Time Warner would generally be classiﬁed as a “cheap” stock in terms of book-to-
market. By many other yardsticks such as earnings or dividends relative to price, however, the stock would
look less attractive from the value standpoint. This suggests that other measures might also serve as the bases
for investment strategies. As an illustration, panels A2 and B2 provide results based on the ratio of earnings
to price. The return spreads based on earnings-to-price, however, are generally lower than the spreads based
on book-to-market. For instance, the sort by this variable in panel A2 of Table 1 yields return spreads of
0.68 percent per month between the extreme portfolios. The spread in size-adjusted average returns over
ﬁve post-formation years is 5.4 percent per year (see panel B2). Note that in both cases the sorts use only
stocks that have positive earnings at the portfolio formation date. The narrower spreads associated with
the earnings yield may be due to the noisy nature of earnings. For instance, the category of stocks with
low earnings-to-price ratios includes not only stocks that are conventionally deemed to be “growth” stocks
(whose current earnings are low but whose future growth prospects are perceived to be high) but also stocks
that have stumbled and have temporarily depressed earnings.
Another valuation indicator that has been relatively overlooked in academic research is the ratio of
cash ﬂow to price. In its simplest form, cash ﬂow is measured as earnings plus depreciation. Portfolios
formed from this investment strategy generate relatively larger return spreads. In panel B3, the portfolio
ranked highest by cash ﬂow to price earns on average 20.1 percent per year over ﬁve years (3.9 percent
after adjusting for size). The difference between the extreme portfolios with respect to average size-adjusted
returns over ﬁve years is 8.8 percent. To the extent that the different indicators are not too highly correlated,
these results suggest that a stategy based on several signals may enhance portfolio peformance.
3It is possible that these ﬁndings are the result of a collective data-snooping exercise by many researchers
sifting through the same data. If so, the success of value strategies may not hold up in other periods or
other markets. Some comfort that this is not the case is afforded by another early study by Chan, Hamao
and Lakonishok (1991). Their contribution is to study the Japanese stock market, which had not previously
been examined in depth, even though it was at that time almost as large as the U.S. market in terms of
capitalization. Panel C of Table 1 provides some of their key ﬁndings. The return differential between
the highest and lowest quartile of stocks ranked by book-to-market is 1.1 percent per month. Their results
for earning-to-price and cash ﬂow-to-price are similar to the U.S. evidence. Finally, the Japanese evidence
does not indicate that value stocks have higher total risk, as measured by the standard deviation of monthly
returns, compared to growth stocks.
The Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok ﬁndings take on added force in light of the conditions of the Japanese
market at the time they conducted their study. In particular the popular sentiment was that, given the spec-
tacular run-up in Japanese stock prices in the 1980s, equity values in Japan could not be analyzed using
conventional approaches developed on U.S. data. The fact that the same overall ﬁndings emerge in two
markets with very different conditions bolsters conﬁdence that data-mining is not the culprit.
Table 2 (adapted from Fama and French (1998)) provides results for a broad sample of countries. Value
and glamour are also deﬁned under a variety of indicators, ranging from book-to-market value of equity to
ratios of either earnings, cash ﬂow, or dividends, to price. The consistency of the evidence is impressive. In
almost every country, the value portfolio generates a higher average return than the glamour portfolio. The
results hold up across the variety of value-growth indicators. The table also reports the standard deviations
of the returns on each portfolio. In general, the return volatilities of the value portfolios are not notably
different from the volatilities of the glamour portfolios. Fama and French also report similar results for
emerging stock markets.
The results above indicate that value stocks in general out-perform glamour stocks across all eligible
stocks. In practice, however, the investable equity universe for many portfolio managers tends to be limited
to larger-capitalization stocks, which tend to be more liquid. Table 3 (from Fama and French (1992)) checks
up on whether the performance of value strategies holds up for larger stocks. Portfolios are formed by
4sorting ﬁrst on size (based on NYSE breakpoints) and then, within each size category, by book-to-market.
In the category of the smallest ﬁrms (size decile 1), the portfolio of value stocks has an average return of
1.92 percent per month, which is 1.22 percent higher than the average return of the glamour stock portfolio.
Value stocks still earn higher returns in the category of the largest stocks, but the margin is less substantial
(0.25 percent per month). Putting aside risk-based explanations, smaller ﬁrms are less widely followed
and the costs of arbitrage may be higher for these stocks. As a result, mispricing patterns might be more
pronounced in this segment of the market, yielding richer opportunities for a value strategy.
2 Explaining the performance of value strategies
While the evidence on returns is relatively uncontroversial, the situation is far less settled when it comes to
providing an explanation for the differences between the performance of value and growth portfolios.
Fama and French (1996) argue that stocks with high ratios of book equity to market value are more
prone to ﬁnancial distress and hence riskier. They employ a version of the Merton (1973) multi-factor asset
pricing model to account for value stocks’ higher risk exposures to a ﬁnancial distress factor, and hence
their higher returns. This argument, however, stretches credulity. On the basis of the risk argument, it would
follow that Internet stocks which had virtually no book value but stellar market values were much less risky
than traditional utility stocks which typically have high book values of equity relative to market. It is also
noteworthy that the idea that value stocks have higher risk surfaced only after their higher returns became
apparent. Data snooping is considered to be a sin, and coming up with ad hoc risk measures to explain
returns should be regarded as no less of a sin.2
Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) argue against this “metaphysical” approach to risk, whereby
higher average returns on an investment strategy must necessarily reﬂect some source of risk. Instead they
follow a more conventional approach and argue that risk does not explain the differences in returns. To
develop the point, Table 4 provides the returns and other characteristics of portfolios formed by classifying
2Daniel and Titman (1997) investigate the argument that differences in comovement patterns of value and glamour stocks
account for their returns. They ﬁnd that differences in factor loadings do not explain the return premiums on value stocks.
5stocks along two indicators: cash ﬂow to price and past growth in sales.3 As noted above, using two signals
helps to lower the chance of misclassifying stocks into value and growth categories. A stock with high cash
ﬂow per dollar of share price, as well low past growth in sales, is more likely to be a value stock with low
expected future growth. In comparison investors are more prone to regard a stock with low cash ﬂow relative
to price and high past sales growth as having more favorable future growth prospects.
Panel A of Table 4 covers familiar ground: the portfolio of value stocks on average out-performs the
glamour stock portfolio by 7.8 percent per year, or 8.7 percent on a size-adjusted basis. These differences
in returns are not accompanied by notable differences in traditional measures of risk, including beta and
volatility.
It is possible, however, that these are crude proxies that do not capture all the relevant risks of the two
portfolios. Panel B of the table provides a more direct evaluation of the risk-based explanation. If the
value strategy is fundamentally riskier, then it should under-perform relative to the growth strategy during
undesirable states of the world when the marginal utility of wealth is high. The key to the risk argument,
then, is to identify such undesirable states. One natural choice is to look at months where the overall
stock market does poorly. Down-market months generally correspond to periods where aggregate wealth
is low so the utility of an extra dollar is high. The approach of examining portfolio performance during
down-markets also corresponds to the notion of downside risk that has gained popularity recently in the
investment community. Along the same lines, periods where the economy suffers downturns and growth
shrinks could also be singled out as low-wealth states.
Lakonishok et al. (1994) follow both approaches to assess the risk of their value strategies. In particular,
they isolate the 25 months with the worst stock market performance (the lowest return on the equally-
weighted market index), the other 88 months with negative market returns remaining after the worst 25,
the 122 months with positive market returns excluding the best 25, and the 25 months with the best market
performance. Returns on the value and glamour portfolios over the corresponding months are reported in
panel B of table 4. In “bad” states of the world, where the market return is negative, value stocks do better
3In each year prior to portfolio formation, the growth rate of sales is calculated for each ﬁrm and ranked. The sales growth
classiﬁcation is based on a ﬁrm’s sales growth ranks over the previous ﬁve years.
6than glamour stocks. Over all months where the market return is negative but excluding the worst 25, the
return advantage to value stocks is 1.4 percent on average. The improvement in returns to value stocks is
somewhat more pronounced in the worst 25 months, where the value portfolio out-performs the glamour
portfolio by 1.8 percent. In “good” states where the market earns a positive return, the value portfolio
at least matches the performance of the glamour portfolio. When the experiment is repeated, only using
quarterly growth in real GNP as the indicator of “good” or “bad” states, the results are similar. Notably, the
value portfolio does not suffer more during down-periods of poor GNP growth: rather, it does better than
the glamour portfolio by 5 percent per quarter.4 All in all, the evidence does not support the view that the
superior returns on value stocks reﬂect their higher fundamental risk.
A competing explanation for the returns on value stocks draws on behavioral and agency cost consid-
erations. Studies in psychology suggest that individuals tend to use simple heuristics for decision-making,
opening up the possibility of judgmental biases in investment behavior (see Kahneman and Riepe (1998)
and Shleifer (2000) for examples and further elaboration). In particular, investors may extrapolate past per-
formance too far into the future. As panel C of Table 4 indicates, value stocks tend to have a past history
of poor performance with respect to growth in earnings, cash ﬂow and sales. Conversely, glamour stocks
have out-shone their value counterparts in terms of past growth. Insofar as investors and brokerage analysts
overlook the lack of persistence in growth rates (see Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002)) and instead
project past growth into the future, favorable sentiment is created for glamour stocks. Furthermore, analysts
have a self-interest in recommending successful stocks in order to generate trading commissions as well as
investment banking business. Typically, growth stocks come from exciting industries and hence are easier
to tout in terms of analyst reports and media coverage. All these considerations play into the career con-
cerns of professional money managers and pension plan executives (see Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny
(1992)). Such individuals may feel vulnerable holding a portfolio of companies that are tainted by lacklus-
ter past performance, so they gravitate toward successful growth-oriented stocks. The upshot of all these
considerations is that value stocks become under-priced, and glamour stocks over-priced, relative to their
4Since stock returns tend to lead the real economy, the performance of the value and glamour portfolios is measured in the
quarter preceding growth in GNP.
7fundamentals. Due to limits of arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the mispricing patterns can persist
over long periods of time.
Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2002) provide some evidence on the existence of extrapolative biases
in the pricing of value and glamour stocks. The common presumption is that the book-to-market ratio is a
measure of a ﬁrm’s future growth opportunities relative to its accounting value. Accordingly a low ratio of
book equity relative to market value suggests that investors expect high future growth prospects compared
to the value of assets in place. If these expectations are correct, there should be a negative association
between the book-to-market ratio and future realized growth. To check whether the ratio predicts future
growth, Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok rank stocks by growth in income before extraordinary items over a
ﬁve-year horizon (only stocks with positive income in the base year enter the sample). Based on the ranking,
stocks are placed into one of ten deciles. Within each decile, they ﬁnd the median book-to-market ratio at
the beginning of the ﬁve-year horizon, and also at the end. The procedure is repeated at the beginning of
each year from 1951 to 1998.
The association between book-to-market ratios and future growth is weak. The stocks ranked in the
top decile by growth in net income typically have a book-to-market ratio of 0.880 at the beginning. This is
higher than the average book-to-market ratio across all stocks of 0.96, so investors do not anticipate these
ﬁrms’ future success. Typically, then, stocks fetching high valuation ratios of book-to-market or price-to-
earnings wind up falling short of investors’ hopes. On the other hand the ex post book-to-market ratio tracks
growth closely. Investors are quick to jump on the bandwagon and chase stocks with high past growth. After
the period of high growth, the top decile of companies trade at a book-to-price ratio of 0.560 (the lowest
across the deciles). Conversely, investors punish the companies with the lowest realized growth. In decile
portfolio 1, the median ex post book-to-market ratio is 1.115 (the highest across the deciles).
If investors incorrectly anchor on past growth as a basis for growth forecasts and for valuation, prices
should subsequently adjust as actual growth materializes. Evidence on whether such corrections take place
is provided by La Porta (1996) and La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). La Porta et al.
look at returns around earnings announcements for value and glamour portfolios based on sorts by book-
to-market. Table 5 reports some of their ﬁndings. An additional beneﬁt of working with announcement
8returns is that over short intervals differences in risk are less likely to be an issue. In the ﬁrst year after
portfolio formation investors tend to be disappointed as news emerges about the earnings of glamour stocks.
The cumulative event return is -0.5 percent for the glamour portfolio. Conversely investors are pleasantly
surprisedaroundannouncementsofvaluestocks’earnings; thecumulativeeventreturnforthesestocksis3.5
percent in the ﬁrst year. The contrast between the market’s response to the subsequent earnings performance
of the two portfolios is large and statistically signiﬁcant in the second and third years as well. This evidence
supports the argument that expectational errors are at least part of the reason for the superior returns on value
stocks. Speciﬁcally, investors have exaggerated hopes about growth stocks, and end up being disappointed
when future performance falls short of the unrealistically high hurdle. By the same token they are unduly
pessimistic about value stocks and wind up being pleasantly surprised.
3 The evidence updated
The bulk of the academic evidence on the returns to value and glamour strategies covers the period ending
in the mid-1990s. In this section we update the evidence to 2001. This is an interesting exercise on several
fronts. First it provides an out-of-sample check on the proﬁtability of value strategies. To the extent that
investors became aware of the beneﬁts to value strategies and adjusted their portfolios, the rewards to value
investing may have been arbitraged away. In a similar vein, such a response may have been responsible for
the demise of the “small ﬁrm effect” after the 1980s. More notably, the late 1990s witnessed the stunning
boom in growth stocks and “dot-com” mania. Investors’ ardor for technology, media, and telecommunica-
tions issues reached feverish heights, and propelled prices of such stocks to stellar levels. Growth stocks in
general earned returns far outstripping those on value stocks.
Table 6 presents returns on benchmark indexes from Frank Russell Company that capture the perfor-
mance of various equity asset classes: large, medium and small-capitalization stocks, subdivided into growth
and value categories. The later part of the 1990s were harsh on value stocks. From 1996 to 1999 the ge-
ometric mean annual return on the Russell 1000 index of large growth stocks is 31.2 percent compared to
19.5 percent for the Russell 1000 large value index. The performance is particularly striking for the largest
9stocks. The Top 200 growth index posted an average return of 33.3 percent over this period, while the
Russell 2000 index of small value stocks languished and earned only 10.2 percent. These trends prompted
analysts and journalists to speculate on the emergence of a new paradigm in equity investing which would
make the value-oriented investor an endangered species.
Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000) sort out the competing explanations for the relative stock-price
performance of the various equity asset classes over the late 1990s. They do this by examining whether
changes in the relative valuations of the equity classes and their returns are accompanied by changes in
operating proﬁtability. Under a rational pricing model, for example, the sizzling performance of growth
stocks in the late 1990s could be explained by a sequence of unanticipated positive shocks to cash ﬂows
(assuming there is no shift in relative risks so discount rates are unaltered). A “new paradigm” perspective
would further posit that these shocks have yet to be fully absorbed in equity values, so the returns to growth
investing will persist for some time in the future.
Table 7 excerpts some of the ﬁndings in Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000). Since the main contrast
concerns the performance of the largest stocks, we only provide the results for the largest 200 stocks each
year classiﬁed as either growth or value on the basis of book-to-market ratios. To get a robust picture of
operating performance, we focus on the behavior of operating income before depreciation, which is less
noisy than net income.5
Panel A of Table 7 highlights the rapid ascent in the ratio of price to operating income for large growth
stocks. At the beginning of 1999, the price-to-income multiple for this category stood at 17.60, an unprece-
dented level relative to its historical average value of 7.42. Large value stocks also fetched a relatively high
multiple in 1999, but the break from its historical average is much less eye-catching. The overall effect is a
sharp expansion of price-to-income multiples for growth stocks relative to value stocks. The widening was
further exacerbated in the remainder of 1999 and the ﬁrst quarter of 2000.
To justify the record-shattering level of the multiple for large growth stocks within a rational pricing
framework, there must have been a dramatic rise in their operating performance in the recent period. Yet
5Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000) also provide results on several performance indicators, under different methodologies
for calculating proﬁtability growth.
10growth in operating income before depreciation shows no dramatic differences between large growth and
large value stocks over 1996–98 (see panel B).
Hence, although large growth stocks earned returns wildly in excess of their historical average, they
did not enjoy a parallel boom in operating performance.6 Rather, the rich pricing of these stocks reﬂected
investors’ rosy expectations of future growth and ﬁrms’ ability to sustain growth. This belief would appear
to be at odds with the increasing competitiveness of world markets, and the extreme difﬁculty of maintaining
market position in the rapidly changing features of the modern environment. Conversely small and mid-cap
value stocks have fallen out of favor with investors, even though their recent operating performance has not
been poor.
Even with the experience of the late 1990s factored in, the historical results are still favorable for value
investing. From the inception of the broad Russell indexes in 1979 to the end of April 2002, value out-
performs growth (see Table 6). The margin of performance is wider in the smaller stocks: returns for the
Russell 2000 value and growth indexes are 16.42 and 10.71 percent respectively. In the case of the larger
stocks in the Russell 1000, however, the advantage to value stocks is not especially striking. The geometric
mean return over 1979 to 2002 is 15.22 percent for the value stocks in the Russell 1000, compared to 13.24
percent for the Russell 1000 growth stocks. Nonetheless, the value indexes have lower standard deviations
than the growth benchmarks, so they should be appealing on this account as well.
One caveat about the Russell benchmarks used in Table 6 bears mention. The indexes do not represent
extreme bets on growth or value compared to, say, the extreme decile portfolios in sorts by book-to-market.
Moreover, the underlying stocks are value-weighted in the index and rely on just two indicators of value-
growth orientation, namely book-to-market and analysts’ long-term growth forecasts. There is, however, no
reason not to use more comprehensive measures of value orientation in order to diversify across signals of
expected return. The results from this exercise are reported in Table 8.
In Table 8 portfolios are formed by sorting stocks on a composite indicator. The composite includes
6It is always possible that future growth in proﬁtability will differ radically from past patterns, and its effects have not shown
up yet in the historical record. This argument, however, would require very bold assumptions to rationalize the stellar valuations
witnessed in 1999 and early 2000. See Asness (2000), and Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000,2002) for further discussion.
11variables such as the book-to-market value of equity, cash ﬂow relative to price, earnings yield and the sales-
to-price ratio. The composite pools information from several valuation measures so as to do a better job in
identifying stocks that are undervalued relative to their fundamentals. In panel A of the table the investable
universe comprises large capitalization stocks, while in panel B small stocks make up the universe. Buy-
and-hold returns over the ﬁrst year following portfolio formation are reported for the bottom two deciles
(the glamour portfolios) and for the top two deciles (the value portfolios).
From 1979 when returns on the Russell 1000 index become available to 2001, the geometric mean
return on the deep value portfolio (decile 10) for large stocks is 20.4 percent. This exceeds the return on the
Russell 1000 value index (15.4 percent), so the use of multiple measures in the composite indicator boosts
the performance of the value strategy. Similarly, when applied to the small stock universe, the strategy on
averageyieldsabetterreturnforthetopdecileportfoliothanthereturnontheRussell2000valuebenchmark.
In the last column of each panel in Table 8, returns are averaged over the top and bottom two deciles and
the spread in returns is calculated. Over the full sample period 1969–2001, the return differential averages
10.4 percent in favor of value investing for the large stock universe. In panel A the value-growth spread is
positive in 23 out of 33 years, or seventy percent of the cases. Echoing the results in Table 3, the gap is more
pronounced for small stocks (panel B), where the return spread is 18.8 percent. Value earns a positive return
spread over growth seventy six percent of the time (in 25 out of 33 years). Taking the more recent years
into account, the large value portfolios fall behind the growth portfolios in 1998 and 1999, but the average
spread over the entire decade of the 1990s is still substantial. From 1990 to 2001 the difference amounts to
12.2 percent for large stocks and 19.4 percent for small stocks. In short, value investing appears to be alive
and well.
4 Conclusion
A large body of empirical research indicates that value stocks on average earn higher returns than growth
stocks. The reward to value investing is more pronounced for small stocks but it is also present in the larger
stocks. The value premium also exists in equity markets outside the U.S.
12The bulk of the empirical research documenting the superiority of value investing stops short of the late
1990s, which have not been kind for value stocks. Growth stocks rocketed in value, prompting speculation
that value investors were an endangered species. A more careful examination, however, suggests that the
differences across the performance of equity classes in the late 1990s were not grounded on fundamental
patterns of proﬁtability growth. Instead, the most plausible interpretation of the events of the late-1990s is
that investor sentiment reached exaggerated levels of optimism about the prospects for technology, media
and telecommunications stocks. The resulting valuations were hard to reconcile with economic logic.
Similarly, the sharp rise and decline in recent years of technology and other growth-oriented stocks calls
into question the argument that growth stocks are less risky investments. Rather, the evidence suggests that
value stocks are not more risky than growth stocks, based on a variety of indicators including beta and return
volatility. Indeed, using one popular risk indicator which focuses on performance in down markets, value
stocks suffer less severely than growth stocks when the stock market or the overall economy does poorly.
Under any but a metaphysical deﬁnition of risk, therefore, the superior performance of value stocks cannot
be attributed to their risk exposures. Instead a more convincing explanation for the value premium rests
on features of investor behavior as well as the agency costs of delegated investment management. Several
studies provide evidence in support of extrapolative biases in investor behavior.
The argument that the value premium is an artifact of data-snooping poses a tougher challenge. In this
respect, however, two features of the debate about value investing are crucial. In particular, a logically
coherent account exists that can explain the returns to value stocks, and there is empirical support for the
extrapolation hypothesis. These features distinguish the value premium from many other anomalous patterns
that have been documented on stock returns. Many apparent violations of the efﬁcient markets hypothesis,
such as day-of-the-week patterns in stock returns, lack a convincing logical basis. In the absence of a
plausible rationale, there is a legitimate concern that the anomalous pattern is merely a statistical ﬂuke that
has been uncovered through data-mining. Instead, the value premium reﬂects ingrained patterns of investor
behavior or the incentives of professional investment managers. As in the case of numerous past episodes
in ﬁnancial history, investors will continue to extrapolate from the past and get excessively excited about
promising new technologies. They will overbid the prices of growth stocks, and conversely, beat down
13value stocks too low. As a result, patient investing in value stocks will continue to be a rewarding long-term
investment strategy.
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16Table 1
Returns (in percent) and characteristics for value-growth investment strategies
Results in part A are from Fama and French (1992). The sample is all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks with data on
returns and accounting information. Monthly returns on equally-weighted portfolios are measured from July 1963 to
December 1990. Results in part B are from Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994), using all NYSE and Amex stocks
with data on returns and accounting information. Buy-and-hold returns on equally-weighted portfolios are measured
annually from April each year, starting from 1968 to 1989. Part C is from Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991), based
on all stocks in the ﬁrst and second sections of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. Monthly equally-weighted portfolio returns
are measured from June 1971 to December 1988. In the sorts by earnings-to-price and cash ﬂow-to-price ratios, results
are provided only for stocks with positive earnings or positive cash ﬂow at the portfolio formation date.
A. Fama and French (1992)
Variable 1A 1B 23456789 1 0 A 1 0 B
(1): Sorted by book-to-market
Monthly return 0.30 0.67 0.87 0.97 1.04 1.17 1.30 1.44 1.50 1.59 1.92 1.83
Beta 1.36 1.34 1.32 1.30 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.35
Log Size 4.53 4.67 4.69 4.56 4.47 4.38 4.23 4.06 3.85 3.51 3.06 2.65
(2) Sorted by earnings-to-price
Monthly return 1.04 0.93 0.94 1.03 1.18 1.22 1.33 1.42 1.46 1.57 1.74 1.72
Beta 1.40 1.35 1.31 1.28 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.24 1.23 1.24 1.28 1.31
Log Size 3.64 4.33 4.61 4.64 4.63 4.58 4.49 4.37 4.28 4.07 3.82 3.52
B. Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994)
Variable 123456789 1 0
(1): Sorted by book-to-market
Annual return 11.0 11.7 13.5 12.3 13.1 15.4 15.4 17.0 18.3 17.3
Average annual return over 5 years 9.3 12.5 14.6 15.4 15.8 16.6 18.4 18.9 19.6 19.8
Size-adjusted average annual return -4.3 -2.0 -0.30 0.4 0.6 1.2 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.5
(2) Sorted by earnings-to-price
Annual return 12.3 12.5 14.0 13.0 13.5 15.6 17.0 18.0 19.3 16.2
Average annual return over 5 years 11.4 12.6 14.3 15.2 16.0 16.7 18.8 19.1 19.6 19.0
Size-adjusted average annual return -3.5 -2.4 -0.9 -0.1 0.5 1.3 2.6 2.6 2.9 1.9
(3) Sorted by cash ﬂow-to-price
Annual return 8.4 12.4 14.0 14.0 15.3 14.8 15.7 17.8 18.3 18.3
Average annual return over 5 years 9.1 12.2 14.5 15.7 16.6 17.1 18.0 19.2 19.9 20.1
Size-adjusted average annual return -4.9 -2.5 -0.6 0.5 1.3 1.9 2.5 3.4 3.7 3.9
C. Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991)
Variable 1234
(1): Sorted by book-to-market
Monthly return 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.4
Monthly standard deviation 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.6
(2) Sorted by earnings-to-price
Monthly return 1.5 1.7 1.8 1.9
Monthly standard deviation 4.3 4.1 4.1 4.3
(3) Sorted by cash ﬂow-to-price
Monthly return 1.4 1.7 1.9 2.2
Monthly standard deviation 4.1 4.1 4.3 4.6Table 2
Annual U.S. dollar returns (in excess of U.S. T-bill rate)
for value and glamour portfolios, by country
Results are from Fama and French (1998). In each market stocks are sorted at the end of each year by book-to-market,
earnings-to-price, cash ﬂow to price, and dividend to price ratios. The value portfolio in each market comprises the
top thirty percent of stocks when ranked by the corresponding ratio; the glamour portfolio comprises the bottom thirty
percent of ranked stocks. The market return in each country is the capitalization-weighted average across all stocks.
The numbers in parentheses below each portfolio average return gives the standard deviation of annual returns. The
sample period is 1975–1995.
Sorted by:
Book-to-market Earnings-price Cash ﬂow-price Dividend-price
Market Value Glamour Value Glamour Value Glamour Value Glamour
U.S. 9.57 14.55 7.75 14.09 7.38 13.74 7.08 11.75 8.01
(14.64) (16.92) (15.79) (18.10) (15.23) (16.73) (15.99) (13.89) (17.04)
Japan 11.88 16.91 7.06 14.14 6.67 14.95 5.66 16.81 7.27
(28.67) (27.74) (30.49) (26.10) (27.62) (31.59) (29.22) (35.01) (27.51)
U.K. 15.33 17.87 13.25 17.46 14.81 18.41 14.51 15.89 12.99
(28.62) (30.03) (27.94) (32.32) (27.00) (35.11) (26.55) (32.18) (26.32)
France 11.26 17.10 9.46 15.68 8.70 16.17 9.30 15.12 6.25
(32.35) (36.60) (30.88) (37.05) (32.35) (36.92) (31.26) (30.06) (33.16)
Germany 9.88 12.77 10.01 11.13 10.58 13.28 5.14 9.99 10.42
(31.36) (30.35) (32.75) (24.62) (34.82) (29.05) (26.94) (24.88) (34.42)
Italy 8.11 5.45 11.44 7.62 12.99 11.05 0.37 10.07 12.68
(43.77) (35.53) (50.65) (42.36) (54.68) (43.52) (38.42) (38.28) (56.66)
Netherlands 13.30 15.77 13.47 14.37 9.26 11.66 11.84 13.47 13.05
(18.81) (33.07) (21.01) (21.07) (20.48) (33.02) (23.26) (21.38) (30.81)
Belgium 12.62 14.90 10.51 15.12 12.90 16.46 12.03 15.16 12.26
(25.88) (28.62) (27.63) (30.47) (27.88) (28.84) (25.57) (26.47) (29.26)
Switzerland 11.07 13.84 10.34 12.59 11.04 12.32 9.78 12.62 10.44
(27.21) (30.00) (28.57) (31.44) (28.81) (36.58) (27.82) (31.00) (27.83)
Sweden 12.44 20.61 12.59 20.61 12.42 17.08 12.50 16.15 11.32
(24.91) (38.31) (26.26) (42.43) (24.76) (30.56) (23.58) (29.55) (25.13)
Australia 8.92 17.62 5.30 15.64 5.97 18.32 4.03 14.62 6.83
(26.31) (21.03) (27.32) (28.19) (28.89) (29.08) (27.46) (28.43) (28.57)
Hong Kong 22.52 26.51 19.35 27.04 22.05 29.33 20.24 23.66 23.30
(41.96) (48.68) (40.21) (44.83) (40.81) (46.24) (42.72) (38.76) (42.05)
Singapore 13.31 21.63 11.96 15.21 13.12 13.42 8.03 10.64 13.10
(27.29) (36.89) (27.71) (29.55) (34.68) (26.24) (28.92) (22.01) (33.92)Table 3
Monthly returns (in percent) for value and glamour
portfolios by market capitalization categories
Results are from Fama and French (1992). The sample is all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks with data on returns and
accounting information. Monthly returns on equally-weighted portfolios are measured from July 1963 to December
1990. Portfolios are formed in June each year by ranking stocks on size into ten portfolios based on breakpoints from
NYSE stocks. Within each size category stocks are further classiﬁed into one of ten portfolios based on book-to-
market ratio. The column labelled “All” reports equally-weighted portfolio average returns for each size category; the
row labelled “All” reports equally-weighted average returns for all stocks classiﬁed in the speciﬁed book-to-market
category.
Sorted by book-to-market
Sorted by size All 1 (Glamour) 23456789 1 0 ( V a l u e )
All 1.23 0.64 0.98 1.06 1.17 1.24 1.26 1.39 1.40 1.50 1.63
1 (Small) 1.47 0.70 1.14 1.20 1.43 1.56 1.51 1.70 1.71 1.82 1.92
2 1.22 0.43 1.05 0.96 1.19 1.33 1.19 1.58 1.28 1.43 1.79
3 1.22 0.56 0.88 1.23 0.95 1.36 1.30 1.30 1.40 1.54 1.60
4 1.19 0.39 0.72 1.06 1.36 1.13 1.21 1.34 1.59 1.51 1.47
5 1.24 0.88 0.65 1.08 1.47 1.13 1.43 1.44 1.26 1.52 1.49
6 1.15 0.70 0.98 1.14 1.23 0.94 1.27 1.19 1.19 1.24 1.50
7 1.07 0.95 1.00 0.99 0.83 0.99 1.13 0.99 1.16 1.10 1.47
8 1.08 0.66 1.13 0.91 0.95 0.99 1.01 1.15 1.05 1.29 1.55
9 0.95 0.44 0.89 0.92 1.00 1.05 0.93 0.82 1.11 1.04 1.22
1 0 (Large) 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.84 0.71 0.79 0.83 0.81 0.96 0.97 1.18T
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5Table 5
Returns around post-formation period earnings announcements
for value and glamour portfolios
Results are from LaPorta, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1997). The sample is all NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq stocks
with data on returns and accounting information. The sample period is 1971–1992. Portfolios are formed in June
each year by ranking stocks on book to market value of equity into ten portfolios based on breakpoints from NYSE
stocks. For every stock, buy-and-hold returns are measured over a window beginning one day before and ending
one day after each earnings announcement over the twenty quarters following portfolio formation. Stock returns are
summed over the four quarters in each post-formation year, and the equally-weighted portfolio return is reported. The
t-statistic for the mean difference between the returns on the value and glamour portfolios is based on the time-series
of post-formation returns.
Sorted by book-to-market Mean t-statistic
Event returns cumulated over 1 (Glamour) 2 9 10 (Value) Difference for difference
First post-formation year -0.472 0.772 3.200 3.532 4.004 5.65
Second post-formation year -0.428 0.688 2.828 3.012 .3.440 7.14
Third post-formation year 0.312 0.796 2.492 3.136 2.824 5.12
Fourth post-formation year 0.804 0.812 2.176 2.644 1.840 3.67
Fifth post-formation year 0.424 1.024 1.368 2.432 2.008 4.49T
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7Table 7
Price-to-income multiples and proﬁtability growth
for large growth and large value portfolios
Results are from Chan, Karceski and Lakonishok (2000). The sample period is 1968–1998, and the sample includes all
NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq domestic ﬁrms. At the end of June each year the largest 200 companies (by equity market
value) are selected and ranked by the ratio of book to market value of equity. Moving from the lowest ranked to the
highest ranked, stocks are classiﬁed as large growth until ﬁfty percent of the ranked stocks’ market capitalization is
reached; the remainder are classiﬁed as large value. After leaving a window of 18 months, value-weighted portfolios
are formed from the stocks in each category. At the beginning of a calendar year each portfolio’s ratio of price to
operating income before depreciation is measured. Growth in operating income before depreciation is also measured
for the stocks in a portfolio relative to the same ﬁrms’ operating income before depreciation from the prior year.
Results are reported for 1996 to 1999, as well as means for price-to-income ratios, and geometric average growth
rates, for selected periods.
Panel A: Price-to-income ratio
Large Large
Year Growth Value
1996 8.42 4.57
1997 10.60 4.89
1998 12.67 6.06
1999 17.60 7.27
1970–98 7.42 3.51
1970–79 8.82 3.31
1980–89 5.26 2.83
1990–98 8.27 4.47
1994–98 9.01 4.88
1996–98 10.56 5.17
Panel B: Portfolio income growth rate
Large Large
Year Growth Value
1996 5.5 11.1
1997 13.9 14.2
1998 9.7 3.9
1970–98 10.6 7.1
1970–79 14.0 10.5
1980–89 8.4 5.1
1990–98 9.3 5.5
1994–98 11.6 10.9
1996–98 9.6 9.6Table 8
Results for deep value investment strategies, 1969–2001
Annual buy-and-hold returns (in percent) are reported for equally-weighted decile portfolios formed on the basis of
multiple fundamental indicators. Returns are also provided for benchmark indexes.
Panel A: Large stocks
Portfolio Russell 1000
Year 1 (Glamour) 2 9 10 (Value) Value S&P500 9,10 - 1,2
1969 -1.5 -8.3 -21.0 -21.6 -8.5 -16.4
1970 -16.6 -15.7 9.5 2.2 4.0 22.0
1971 37.2 28.4 14.8 12.0 14.3 -19.4
1972 23.8 11.6 11.3 10.8 19.0 -6.7
1973 -32.2 -26.2 -10.2 -21.2 -14.7 13.5
1974 -42.1 -38.6 -18.6 -14.3 -26.5 23.9
1975 19.3 38.5 62.9 61.2 37.2 33.1
1976 6.9 21.0 50.1 54.7 23.8 38.5
1977 -2.4 -4.7 6.2 7.2 -7.2 10.2
1978 11.6 7.9 12.7 16.8 6.6 5.0
1979 41.7 28.9 34.2 30.7 20.6 18.4 -2.8
1980 68.3 48.3 16.8 22.9 24.4 32.4 -38.5
1981 -16.3 -8.0 10.0 14.1 1.3 -4.9 24.2
1982 9.2 14.7 24.8 29.8 20.0 21.4 15.4
1983 16.3 16.7 31.5 39.0 28.3 22.5 18.7
1984 -22.5 -5.1 11.9 15.5 10.1 6.3 27.4
1985 22.8 35.9 35.5 38.3 31.5 32.2 7.6
1986 12.6 8.6 21.9 21.6 20.0 18.5 11.2
1987 -5.4 5.4 1.2 -3.1 0.5 5.2 -1.0
1988 6.9 9.4 33.2 32.7 23.2 16.8 24.8
1989 32.6 27.3 19.1 19.5 25.2 31.5 -10.7
1990 -5.7 -8.7 -15.6 -21.8 -8.1 -3.2 -11.5
1991 62.0 34.4 47.5 55.9 24.6 30.6 3.5
1992 -8.0 3.2 24.0 26.1 13.8 7.7 27.5
1993 16.6 12.9 12.6 20.3 18.1 10.0 1.7
1994 -13.6 -0.1 -0.7 3.1 -2.0 1.3 8.0
1995 29.8 21.7 40.5 39.0 38.4 37.4 14.0
1996 12.0 14.5 22.4 21.5 21.6 23.1 8.7
1997 0.3 19.8 33.1 34.4 35.2 33.4 23.7
1998 19.7 12.8 6.2 -2.0 15.6 28.6 -14.1
1999 62.3 24.7 7.5 12.3 7.4 21.0 -33.6
2000 -34.9 -18.6 14.4 21.6 7.0 -9.1 44.7
2001 -40.0 -26.1 16.8 26.2 -5.6 -11.9 54.5
Geometric means
1969–2001 4.5 6.7 15.6 16.4 11.4 10.4
1979–2001 7.9 10.4 18.6 20.4 15.4 15.1 10.4
1990–2001 3.8 6.0 16.1 18.0 12.9 12.9 12.2Panel B: Small stocks
Portfolio Russell 2000 Russell
Year 1 (Glamour) 2 9 10 (Value) Value 2000 9,10 - 1,2
1969 -30.2 -13.8 -20.5 -25.0 -0.7
1970 -35.9 -24.3 -2.4 10.1 33.9
1971 29.0 18.9 14.1 15.9 -8.9
1972 13.5 -0.4 12.7 6.5 3.1
1973 -35.1 -40.1 -30.0 -25.8 9.7
1974 -42.5 -39.1 -19.3 -11.6 25.3
1975 46.4 50.6 69.8 62.1 17.4
1976 28.0 41.8 54.9 49.9 17.5
1977 9.0 13.6 17.0 18.4 6.4
1978 18.3 21.7 19.2 19.8 -0.5
1979 56.1 59.8 28.0 32.6 35.4 43.1 -27.7
1980 65.3 57.6 23.2 28.6 25.4 38.6 -35.5
1981 -38.5 -16.8 20.0 25.7 14.9 2.0 50.5
1982 5.3 13.2 33.5 44.7 28.5 24.9 29.9
1983 3.4 16.2 41.3 52.3 38.6 29.1 37.0
1984 -30.0 -19.7 15.0 19.3 2.3 -7.3 42.0
1985 23.2 29.6 41.0 41.0 31.0 31.1 14.6
1986 -0.9 7.0 13.7 24.7 7.4 5.7 16.1
1987 -18.7 -10.3 -6.1 4.0 -7.1 -8.8 13.5
1988 -5.2 13.3 39.2 37.2 29.5 24.9 34.1
1989 26.3 19.3 17.5 12.8 12.4 16.2 -7.7
1990 -24.0 -14.6 -19.3 -22.0 -21.8 -19.5 -1.4
1991 51.0 38.8 48.4 46.0 41.7 46.1 2.3
1992 -21.3 -2.2 28.0 29.4 29.1 18.4 40.4
1993 -5.9 10.0 18.5 18.3 23.8 18.9 16.3
1994 -35.2 -11.3 2.8 4.0 -1.6 -1.8 26.7
1995 27.8 35.4 32.9 32.0 25.8 28.4 0.9
1996 -7.5 13.9 29.3 28.6 21.4 16.5 25.7
1997 -11.7 3.6 40.1 39.3 31.8 22.4 43.7
1998 -6.5 1.2 -0.7 -2.4 -6.5 -2.5 1.1
1999 52.8 26.2 14.3 6.4 -1.5 21.3 -29.1
2000 -38.9 -23.8 5.7 12.5 22.8 -3.0 40.5
2001 -7.8 -13.5 40.9 41.3 14.0 2.5 51.7
Geometric means
1969–2001 -2.8 4.8 16.6 18.3 16.5
1979–2001 -1.8 7.8 20.8 22.8 16.0 13.8 18.8
1990–2001 -6.2 3.6 18.4 17.7 13.4 11.0 19.4